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Studies on the term structure of interest rates have generally focused on two issues: (1) 
the slope of the yield curve and (2) whether Jong-term instruments attract a maturity 
premium over the short-term instruments. In some studies attempts have been made to use 
the tem1 structure of interest rates to test for market efficiency specifically for 
government securities (Hambugcr and Platt (1975), Phillips and Pippenger (1976), 
Pesando (1978, 1979), Mishkin (1980) and Godbout et al (2002) ). The argument for 
using the term structure to test for market efficiency is that if a data set is consistent with a 
given term structure theory, then the market producing that data is efficient. The ability of a 
data set to support the theory is assessed in terms of the presence of a term premium 
and/or a slope significantly different from zero. While a significant slope is amenable to 
other factors such as the trend of the economy, a significant term premium does not 
necessarily offer sufficient evidence to accept most of the term structure theories. 
In the absence of a biased relative demand between short- and long term instruments, 
the premium is solely accounted for as compensation to the buyers of long-term 
instruments for loss of liquidity and uncertainty over the life of the instruments. 
However, the premium may be absent in the presence of a well-developed secondary 
market where there are no transaction costs - as assumed in most studies.1 This is because 
1 A study by Shen and Stan ( 1998) suggests that modeling the term structure of :interest rate will reveal the 
existence of a term premium :if transaction costs are explicitly incorporated in the modeling process or that, in 
the holders can easily obtain liquidity by selling the instruments in this market. These two 
features -- the ability of the secondary market to minimize the liquidity risk and the 
assumption of no transaction costs arc common in most studies since they use interest 
rates based on yields to maturity for debt instruments in the secondary market. Even 
where primary market yields are used, such as in Godbout et al. (2002), the instruments 
do end up being traded in the secondary market since they are quoted in this market. 
Though government securities - on which the term structure of interest rates is 
generally based - have secondary markets in most countries, there exist a number of 
economies, particularly in the developing world, where they do not have an organized 
secondary market. On the other hand, while the auction systems in these economies are 
comparable to those where secondary markets exist, very little exists in the literature on the 
structure of the yields from primary market in these economies and whether these 
markets are efficient. 
One implication of using primary market data, in the absence of secondary market, is 
that the primary market may be generating limited information to test for market 
efficiency. For example, while it is possible to have yields to maturity or holding period 
returns based on daily prices observed in the secondary market, primary market auctions, 
and hence the observed yield, are held once a week or even less frequently. In addition, 
with the presence of a secondary market, several prices are observed for each issued 
instrument, but only one price - that obtained in the auction - is observed when there is 
no secondary market. All these factors create the need to use additional information that 
is not directly accrued to the market to test its efficiency. Fama (1975) and Carr, Pesando 
reality, transaction costs do not exist. The latter is likely to be the case in a situation where there is no secondary 
market since investors are expected to hold the instruments until they mature. 
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and Smith (1976), among others, have used the relationship between inflation 
expectations and nominal interest rates for this purpose. Fama (1975) argues that 
"... If the inflation rate is to some extent predictable, and if the one-period 
equilibrium expected real return does not change in such a way as to exactly offset 
changes in the expected rate of inflation, then in an efficient market there will be a 
relationship between the one-period nominal interest rate observed at a point in time 
and the one-period rate of inflation subsequently observed. If the inflation rate is to 
some extent predictable and no such relationship exists, the market is inefficient: in 
setting the nominal interest rate, it overlooks relevant information about future 
inflation" (pp.269). 
One condition that enhances inflation predictability is a central bank that primarily 
focuses on inflation targeting. 
1.2 Statement of the Problem and Objectives of the Study 
It can be argued that the pricing process of treasury securities in the primary market 
and hence the nature and structure of the yields are different from situations where the 
securities have secondary markets. Theoretically, the most obvious effect of the absence 
of a developed secondary market is the presence of greater liquidity risk. The fact that 
investors hold securities until they mature and hence incur no transaction costs implies that 
when there is no secondary market, the yields obtained in an efficient primary market 
display term premia that are statistically significant. In addition, where inflation targeting 
exists, these yields are also expected to reflect inflation expectations. 
, 
_) 
This study examines the pricing process of treasury bills in Tanzania and how it is 
related to the term structure of interest rates and the notion of market efficiency. It uses 
the biased expectations theory of the term structure of interest rates and the theory of 
market efficiency to derive a representation of the behavior of the yields to maturity 
obtained from Treasury bill auctions. The understanding of market efficiency and 
investors' rationality is enhanced by an examination of how the yields are influenced by 
inflation expectations. The study addresses and tests two main issues: 
1. Using yields from treasury bills auctions to estimate the parameters of the term 
structure of interest rate models and test for market efficiency. 
2. Modeling the yields to establish whether they reflect inflation expectations. 
Both the yield-to-maturity obtained from the lowest successful price bids (LSPY) and the 
yields based on weighted average price (WAY) are used separately to establish which 
yield produces more satisfactory results. 
The study focuses on the short end of the maturity spectrum of the term structure of 
interest rates with the yields and inflation rates covering periods of not more than one year. 
Shorter-term yields have been viewed as being more reliable indicator of markets' 
expectation and having the advantage of conforming more closely to the likely policy 
horizons of central banks (Browne and Manasse, 1989). These issues are addressed and 
tested using yields obtained from the results of weekly Treasury bill auctions for three 
maturities - 91-days, 182-days and 364-days - as well as three- and six-months inflation 
rates. 
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1.3 Significance of the Study 
The general significance of this study derives from its introduction and use of a new set 
of data in understanding the term structure of interest rates and testing for primary market 
efficiency. The data are also different in the sense that they come from a situation where 
treasury bills do not have secondary market and the central bank employs inflation targeting. 
While the Bank of Tanzania (BOT), which is the central bank of Tanzania, has been 
auctioning treasury securities since 1993, there has not been an organized secondary 
market for the securities2. On the other hand, monetary policy in Tanzania is geared 
towards monitoring inflation with inflation targeting being the central bank's primary 
policy objective since 1995. 
Of particular significance is the use of the yields to maturity obtained from the lowest 
successful price bids (LSPY) and comparing the results with those from the yields based 
on weighted average price (WAY). The BOT uses a discriminatory pricing auction system 
where successful bidders pay their respective bid prices which makes the WAY the 
reported market yield. The WAY is the yield implied by the weighted average price 
obtained in a particular auction, which in tum is computed by weighing all successful bid 
prices by their respective amounts. With discriminatory pricing system bidders obtain 
different yields: those quoting the lowest successful price obtain the highest yield in a 
particular auction while those quoting the highest bid price end with the lowest yield. The 
former group quotes a price that is "just right" to ensure an allocation while the latter is 
quoting a price that is "too much". It may be argued that bidders quoting the lowest 
successful price, and hence earning the LSPY, are likely to be the better-informed traders. 
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They also seek to exploit any arbitrage opportunities arising from existence of market 
imperfections, which, in the long run, enhances market efficiency. Thus, the LSPY may 
be of greater consequence in testing for market efficiency and may also reflect more 
satisfactory inflation expectations than WAY. In this study both the LSPY and WAY are 
used to estimate the parameters of the term structure of interest rate equations and 
modeling the yields to establish whether they reflect inflation expectations. A comparison 
is then made for the results from the two yields. This approach is somehow different from 
the one used in a study by Godbout et al. (2002) who also used the yield obtained by the 
lowest successful price but in a different context. In their study, they used the dispersion 
between the yield obtained by the lowest and highest prices to examine whether there is a 
link between the dispersion and the term structure model. They found that the term 
structure model was likely to fail in weeks where yields are highly dispersed and, in their 
view, this "lend credence to the belief that something unusual happens to the [Canadian] 
Treasury bill market whenever there is a large degree of dispersion in auction yields" (p. 
9). Since the dispersion is a product of both lowest and highest prices, this study focuses 
on one aspect of the dispersion and assesses its link with the term structure model. 
To the BOT, this study serves as an initial assessment of their auction system which 
uses discriminatory prices, rather than a single uniform price, in allocating securities to 
bidders. The results on market efficiency can be used as a basis for analyzing the integrity 
of the auction process and whether there is a need to revise the rules governing the 
auction of the securities. In general, the exploratory nature of the study forms the basis for 
2 A decision was made in 2002 to list government securities - both treasury bills and bonds - in the Dar-es 
Salaam Stock Exchange. So far, the process is not yet complete. 
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understanding the term structure of interest rates in Tanzania and open the door for more 
researches in this area. 
1.4 An Overview 
This dissertation consists of five chapters. The preceding discussion in this first 
chapter involves background information to the study, the statement of the problem, the 
objectives of the study and the importance of the study. The second chapter provides a 
review of the pertinent literature to the study. Attention is paid to the information content 
of the term structure of interest rates, modelling of the term structure, the relationship 
between nominal interest rate and inflation expectation as well as the use of the term 
structure model and the Fisher hypothesis to test for market efficiency. In this chapter a 
review of some previous results is made as well as giving an overview of the institutional 
characteristics of the Treasury bill market. 
The third chapter discusses the research design used in the study. It focuses on 
developing the equations to be estimated and the data used in the study. Chapter four 
covers data analysis, the findings and their interpretation. The last chapter gives a 
conclusion and summary of the discussion. The chapter also highlights the limitations of 




2.1 The Information Content of the Term Structure of Interest Rates and Market 
Efficiency 
In general, the term structure of interest rates focuses on the relationship between 
short term and long-term interest rates assuming constant individual risk. Holding 
individual risk constant is achieved by using government securities. Understanding the 
term structure of interest rates for a particular economy serves a number of purposes. 
First, the term structure is important in describing the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy. Godbout et al. (2002) argue this from the view that the monetary 
authorities have the greatest influence over the shorter-term interest rates (through policy 
instruments such as open market operations and repurchase agreements) than the longer-
term rates. On the other hand, it is the longer-term rates that are more relevant to 
investment and consumption decisions. Thus, the term structure provides for the link 
between the policy instruments used by monetary authorities and longer-term rates and in 
tum the link with investment and consumption. It is important, however, to bear in mind 
that different theories of the term structure have different implications on whether the 
link between monetary policy and any particular long-term interest rate holds and how 
direct the link is. Engsted ( 1994 ), for example, points out that if the expectations 
hypothesis of the term structure holds, there is a stable one-to-one relationship between 
short- and long-term interest rates. This implies, for instance, that while the monetary 
authority can change the short- and long-tenn interest rates by altering the relative 
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supplies of short- and long-term bonds, this will not permanently 'twist' the relationship 
in the term structure. 
A second point in the use of the term structure of interest rates is as an alternative 
indicator of monetary policy. The suggestion that there may exist some problems in 
interpretation of monetary aggregates in some countries (Browne and Manasse, 1989) 
makes monetary aggregates less reliable indicator of monetary policy. As a result, the term 
structure of interest rates is used in addition, or as an alternative, to monetary aggregates in 
gauging monetary policy. 
A third significance is related to the first two and it arises from empirical evidences 
linking the term structure with economic variables such as interest rates, inflation, and 
economic activity. While there is a relationship between the term structure and the trend 
of the economy (Gray, 1973; Luckett, 1967; and Campbell, 1995) it has been found that 
the term structure is a useful predictor of inflation (Mishkin, 1990; Frankel and Lown, 
1994), real economic activity (Estrella and Hardouvelis, 1991; Harvey, 1997); and future 
short-term interest rates (Mankiw, 1986; Campbell and Shiller, 1987, 1991; Mishkin, 
1988). On the ability of the yield curve to forecast real economic activity, studies in the 
US and Canada indicate that the yield curve forecasts economic growth more accurately 
than models based on time series or on the index of leading indicators (Harvey, 1997). A 
steeper yield curve implies faster future growth in real output while a flatter yield curve 
implies slower future growth in real output (Estrella and Hardouvelis, 1991). A study by 
Mishkin (1990) found that at longer maturities, the term structure of interest rates could 
be used to help assess future inflationary pressure. This was despite some of the data 
rejecting the Fisher effect and even indicating - in some cases - a negative correlation of 
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the slope of the real term structure with the slope of the nominal term structure. Similar 
results, with some improvement in the predictive power, have also been observed on 
shorter maturities ranging from 3 to 12 months (Frankel and Lown, 1994). 
Finally, analyzing the term structure of interest rates using yields from auctions is 
important for regulatory purposes, the choice of the auction system as well as serving as one 
of the indicators of the integrity of the auction process and hence market efficiency. The 
latter derives not only from the fact that market participants seek to exploit arbitrage 
opportunities that may be present between different maturities but also that markets are 
occasionally subject to "squeeze" and manipulations. A paper by the Bank of Canada 
(1998) points out the extent to which " ... specific issues [ of government securities] trade 
off of the theoretical yield curve" as one of the indicators of a possible squeeze in the 
market. Thus, where the yield curve deviate significantly from its theoretical path, there 
may be a need to look at the market's regulatory framework. One example is when the 
U.S. the Treasury began to experiment with uniform-price auctions, in early 1990s, to 
address the problem of possible collusion among bidders. And when a decision was made 
in 1998 to switch from discriminatory price system to uniform price, it was argued that 
the aim was to make some improvements in the efficiency of market operations based on 
a study showing that the new system produces a broader distribution of auction awards 
(Pulizzi and Nicholson, 1998). 
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2.2 The Term Structure of Interest Rates and Market Efficiency: Theoretical 
Models 
2.2.1 Modeling the Term Structure of Interest Rates 
To understand better the approach to be used in testing the issues in this study, a 
summary of literature related to modeling the term structure of interest rates and testing 
for market efficiency is presented. These two aspects are essentially interrelated since the 
test for market efficiency is also based on a particular model of the term structure of 
interest rates. The basic hypothesis in the structure of interest rates is that it is primarily 
determined by expectation of the future course of short-term interest rates. This is the 
essence of the expectation theory and its derivatives. It hypothesizes that the yield on a 
long-tenn instrument is some average of the current one-period rate (the short-term rate) 
and short-term rates expected to occur over the life of the long-tenn instrument. 
Technically the expectation theory implies that the expected gross annual yield for a 
long-tenn instrument equals the geometric average of the gross yields for short-term 
instruments. This can be presented as 
n-1 
(1 + fnt)" = (1 + i1J TI (1 + E1il,r+j) (2.1) 3 
}=1 
Where In,t is the yield for an instrument with n period maturity at time t, 
i 1,t is the yield for a one period instrument at time t, and 
3 For consistency i is used to denote nominal yield, and II the inflation rate. In addition the tenns yield, 
rate of return and interest rate \Yill be assumed to ha\ e the same meaning. 
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Eti1,t+j is the expected yield for a one period instrument in period t+j. 
The "expected" yields are used since future short-term yields are unobservable at time t 
but it is assumed that market participants estimate them with some degree of accuracy. In 
addition £ 1 indicates that this expectation is formed at time t based on relevant 
information available to the market participants at this time. The equation above 
represents the pure (unbiased) expectation theory and is based on two assumptions. First, 
investors view all securities that have the same liquidity, risk, information costs, and tax 
treatment as perfect substitutes. This implies that investors care about returns but not the 
length to maturity. Secondly, investors are able to re-invest the proceeds from short-term 
obligations at the expected (future) short-term rate. The two assumptions imply that for a 
given holding period, investors starting with the same initial investment end with the 
same terminal value irrespective of the length to maturity of the securities they hold. 
They also imply that there are no systematic arbitrage opportunities in the market. 
Equation (2.1) can be written in logarithm form as 
n-1 
n ln(l + f n,t) = ln(l + il,t) + I ln(l + EJ1,t+ j) 
j=l 
(2.2) 
In general, for a value i that is small relative to 1, ln(l +i) is approximately equal to i. 
Since interest rates are generally small relative to 1, this approximation gives 
n-1 
Jn,t = -;(il,t + L£til,t+j) 
f=l 
(2.3) 
This approximation is widely used in term structure studies (from the earlier work of 
Meiselman, 1962) and does not seem to affect the results. 
In reality, however, instruments of all maturities may not have identical liquidity and 
risks and may, in fact, appeal to different groups of market participants. Consequently the 
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general representation found in most literature is that the holding-period returns for 
instruments of different maturities differ by a constant premia. This extends equation 
(2.3) to; 
n-1 
fn,t =~(il,t + LEtil,t+j)+B 
j=I 
Where 8 is a constant term premium 
(2.4) 
While it is prudent to assume that this premium varies monotonically with the length to 
maturity, it is often assumed that for a given maturity, the premium is constant. This has 
been a very important assumption in testing for the plausibility of the theory and the 
existence of market efficiency (see, for example, Hamburger and Platt, 1973; Phillips and 
Pippinger, 1976; Pesando, 1978 and 1979; and Godbout et al. 2002). 
In general, equation (2.4) represents biased expectations and identifying it with a 
particular term structure theory depends on how to account for the premium. Cox et al. 
(1981) is perhaps the most prominent work that has attempted to explain the expectation 
theory from different viewpoints based on at least three distinct propositions. Other 
studies have adopted more restrictive approaches: Mishkin (1980) accounts for the 
premium based on the existence of preferred maturity aspect only; Roll (1970) terms the 
relationship 'stationary variant of the market segmentation hypothesis'; Modgliani and 
Shiller, (1973) consider the relationship a variation of the expectations theory that 
recognizes the presence of a term premium; and Meiselman (1962) views it as the 
expectations theory that depends on risk aversion. The many different versions of 
expectations theory are partly responsible for problems encountered in the interpretation 
of empirical works on the term structure theories. In this study, both liquidity preference 
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and market segmentation are considered the main factors behind the premium and the 
theory is simply referred to as a biased expectations theory. The postulate in the biased 
expectation theory used here, and flowing from the works cited above, is that each market 
participant has a preferred maturity, liquidity, risk tolerance, and tax exposure - in other 
words, habitat - for securities. With government securities having zero default risk and 
assuming no tax treatment differentials, the premium in the tem1 structure is only based 
on preference for liquidity and/or instruments of a particular maturity. Thus, the premium 
is explained by two sub- theories - the expectations with liquidity preference and the 
existence of preferred maturity. The expectations with liquidity preference aspect 
believes that the term structure reflects the expectation of the future path of interest rates 
as well as liquidity premium. The liquidity premium recognizes that there is a price risk 
associated with long-term instruments and market participants must be compensated for 
assuming this risk. Hicks (1946) is probably the first author to discuss the liquidity 
preference side of the premium. He argued that since borrowers typically undertake long-
term projects they prefer to issue long-term securities so as to hedge against the risk of 
fluctuating in interest costs and probably to take advantage of the increased flexibility 
resulting from using funds borrowed on long-term basis4. On the other hand, lenders 
prefer to hold short-term securities to maintain liquidity and avoid the fluctuation in 
portfolio value associated with holding long-term securities. Thus, investors prefer to 
hold short-tem1 instruments (with a low expected return) but will hold long-term 
instruments if they are paid a premium to compensate for the loss of liquidity. 
4 This should not be considered as a very important argument in the term structure since the term structure 
uses yields on instruments issued by the government. \Vh1ch has objectives that are sometimes different 
from that of a private bonower. 
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Conversely, borrowers are willing to pay a premium for the longer liquidity and increased 
flexibility in using funds borrowed on long-term basis. Long-term instruments are also 
viewed as poorer money substitutes hence calling for higher yield to compensate for the 
'non-pecuniary' return earned by short-term instruments when serving as money 
substitutes. With liquidity preference being considered independently, the premium in 
equation (2.4) is always positive and it rises monotonically with the term to maturity. 
Accounting for the premium based on the preference for a particular maturity 
originates from Modigliani and Sutch (1966) who viewed the premium as a reflection of 
the time dimension of the investment objective. That is, the rate of time preference or 
desire to consume at a particular point of time determines the investment horizon of 
investors which, in tum has a major influence on the term premium. A latter refinement 
by Cox et al. ( 1981) considers risk aversion rather than the time dimension as the key 
determinant. In both, the general argument is that market participants have a range of 
maturities - as determined by risk aversion attitude or the time dimension of investment 
objective - in which they prefer to operate. The preferred maturity ranges, or habitats, 
affect the demand and supply of instruments of different maturities. Assuming discrete 
and non-overlapping maturity ranges5, the relative demand position in a given maturity 
segment determines the yield for the instrument of that particular maturity. In the 
presence of excess demand in a given segment, a risk premium is needed to induce 
market participants to move from their preferred habitat to "less preferred" habitat, hence 
bringing about equilibrium in all market segments. Thus, with the premium being 
determined by the market forces - in relative terms - its sign in equation (2.4) can be 
5 This is the key assumption that distinguishes Modigliani and Stuch's view from Hicks'. Hicks argued that 
the maturity ranges overlap so that there is a continuum of excess demand for funds along the term axis. 
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positive or negative. If, for example, buyers have a strong preference for long-term 
instruments while sellers' preference is predominantly in short-term borrowing, then the 
relative demand for short-term instruments is lower than the one for long-term 
instruments. In this situation short-term instruments would presumably attract a premium 
to account for the uncertainty that the buyers are exposing themselves to by buying short-
term rather than long-term instruments. The implication of the preference for a particular 
maturity is that the shape of the yield curve is affected by changes in the supply and 
demand for instruments of a particular maturity. It is worthwhile to note that the two 
aspects of the preferred habitat theory are not unrelated. For example, if buyers have a 
strong preference for short-term instruments while sellers' preference is in issuing long-
term instruments, the preferred maturity aspect results into excess demand in the short-
term instruments and consequently long-term instruments having a yield premium over 
short-term instruments. On the other hand a strong preference for short-term instruments 
implies that they are more liquid than long-term instruments hence justifying the 
premium based on the liquidity preference theory. 
With the two aspects of the preferred habitat theory implying that the sign of the 
premium is not determined unambiguously the question here is: What is the most likely 
sign when equation (2.4) is modeled using yields from the primary market? It has to be 
noted that two conditions have to be satisfied for the premium to be negative. First, the 
relative demand for long-term instruments has to be higher than the one for short-term 
instruments creating excess demand for long-term instruments. Secondly, the risk 
premium that buyers demand to move from their preferred long-term maturity range to 
short-tenn maturity outweighs the liquidity premium that short-term instruments attract 
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over long-term instruments. The absence of the second condition means that the liquidity 
premium is dominant while the absence of the first condition means that the premiums 
resulting from liquidity preference and the existence of preferred maturity range reinforce 
each other. In both situations a positive premium results. In this study it is hypothesized 
that long-term instruments command a premium over short-term instruments (i.e. 8 in 
equation 2.4 is positive) and that this premium is significantly different from zero. This 
hypothesis is based on some arguments and assumptions. First, it has often been argued 
that the liquidity part account for most of the premium particularly for treasury bills. For 
example, using the bid-ask spread as a proxy for liquidity premium, Shen and Starr (1998) 
show that the liquidity premium is priced in the bill market and account for a substantial 
portion of the term premium, sometimes to the exclusion of a risk premium in the term 
structure. With the liquidity premium being the dominant component it is likely that it will 
offset any negative premium arising from existence of a biased relative demand. Second, 
assuming that market participants have a preference for a particular maturity, the premium 
arises only when there are relative demand imbalances in the markets. However, if there 
are very large relative demand imbalances the yield curves may not give the correct 
information about the future course of short-term interest rates - a potential for the 
breakdown of the term structure relationship. Also, in the absence of "abnormal" market 
or economic conditions such as recession and a prolonged biased risk preference, primary 
markets for government securities can be assumed to experience a balanced relative 
demand particularly since the supply is assumed to be fixed: and even when there is 
excess demand for one maturity segment such phenomena is unlikely to exist for a 
prolonged period of time. This is in line with findings that segmentation effects seem to 
17 
be sufficiently small (Browne and Manasse, 1989) and may imply that, taken on its own, 
the effect of preference for a particular maturity does not lead to a significant term 
premium. This is even more critical in the treasury bill market where the deviation -
measured in time - that market participants take from their preferred maturity is small. 
As a result, the premium asked for a switch, say, from six-months to three-months, is also 
likely to be very small. Thus, the biased expectations hypothesis used here postulates that 
the term premium is positive and is time invariant. 
2.2.2 Expectations Formation and Rational Expectations 
The key issue in equation (2.4), which has taken central stage in modeling the term 
structure of interest rates, is how the expectations on future short-term interest rates are 
formed. Expectations are not directly observable though they are generally viewed as being 
formed on the basis of available information. However, the nature of this information and 
whether direct data exist to compute market participants' expectations make it difficult to 
formulate explicitly a model for expectation formation. Consequently, the type of 
information and the way it is incorporated in the term structure modeling process has 
evolved over time. 
The early studies considered short-term interest rates expectations based on past short-
term interest rates and explicitly incorporated this in the modeling process (Modigliani and 
Sutch (1966), Modigliani and Shiller (1973), and Dobson et al (1976)). Nelson (1972) 
decomposed expectations into two components. The first is the expectation conditional 
on the history of the spot-rate sequence while the second is a random disturbance. In 
effect, the latter component represents information other than that from historical spot 
18 
rates. From Nelson's general proposition, variants of interest rate expectations can be 
inferred. For example, expectations for one-period interest rate one period into the future 
could take the form E1i1,t 11= iu+ Et (static expectation) or Eriu+1°= iu+A(i1*- i1,t) + E1 where 
i 1* is the "normal" interest rate and A the adjustment coefficient (regressive mechanism that 
adjusts to "normal" interest rate) or E1i1,1+1=J:w_;iu-:i+ Et for j Oto n (weighted average of 
present and past short-term rates)6. In general, expectations in the early studies contained 
both regressive and extrapolative elements and long-term rates were viewed as a 
distributed lag of past and present short-term rates. The main weakness of the expectation 
formation process in these studies is that it considers present and past short-term rates as the 
only relevant information in estimating future short-term rates. Sargent (1972), for 
example, does not only emphasize the need for expectations to be future oriented but also 
identifies money supply, price level, rate and composition of income as factors 
influencing future interest rates. There are also questions regarding the existence of a long 
run ( or normal) value of i, whether interest rate return to this value and the time it takes 
for this to happen. 
While the observed forward rates have also been used where available (Mishkin 
1988) most studies have used the rational expectations assumption. The concept, which 
gained significant importance following the contribution by Modigliani and Shiller (1973), 
is based on the assumption that economic agents have perfect foresight and the expected 
short-term rates fully reflect all the information available, and which is relevant as soon as 
it becomes available. It implicitly posits that market participants use a model that leads to 
6 Dobson et al (1976) contains a good summary of econometTic models of expectations formation based on 
the use of past interest rates 
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random forecasting errors. As a result the relation between the expectations and the actual 
has the form 
(2.5) 
Where Et+ 1 is a random error term 
The random error term is assumed to be independent and identically distributed with a 
zero mean and a constant variance. 
With an assumption on yield expectations in place, it is now possible to develop an 
equation for the relationship between one- and two-period yields based on equation 2.4. 
Considering a one period (forward) expectation, the relationship between two- and one-
period yields is specified as: 
(2.6a) 
Where i 1 and h are one- and two-period yields respectively, and 
81 is a one-period forward liquidity premium. 
This can be rewritten as 
(2.6b) 





Equation 7b is estimable and can be written as a linear approximation of the forecasting 
error ( as in Godbout et al 2002) or based on the spread ( as in Mankiw and Miron 1986). 
In this study the latter approach is used since it also represents a form of the Meiselman's 
error-learning cycle. Subtracting 2iu from both sides of equation (2.7b) and dropping the 
maturity subscript (for convenience) gives 
(2.8a) 
In a 1inear regression form, equation 2.8a is written as 
(2.8b) 
Equation 2.8(b) states that the expected one period change in the short-tenn yield (the 1eft 
hand side) is a linear function of the current yield spread between long- and short-term 
yield and that the spread is a forecast of change in the short-term yield. This implies that 
the coefficient ~ is a variation of the slope of the yield curve 7 hence making this 
relationship more appropriate in modeling than that imp1ied by equation 2. 7(a). The 
7 Strictly speaking, this is not the slope of the yield curve though it is often referred to as such. In a two 
period model such as equation Sb it represent the rate of change of the short-term rate per a unit change in 
the spread between long- and short-term rate 
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relationship in equation 2.7(a) can be misleading by suggesting that the current and 
expected short-term yields have separate effectson the current long-term yields. In 
addition, equation 2.8(b) involves differencing which is useful in ensuring data 
stationarity. Notice that this equation contains both the general expectations theory and 
the hypothesis of rational expectations meaning that rational expectations is an integral 
part of the expectations theory. If the theory as defined in equation 2.8(b) holds, then it is 
expected that B should be positive and not significantly different from 2 and, based on the 
earlier arguments, a is expected to have a negative sign and significantly different from 
zero.8 
The plausibility of the approach used to develop the testable model above has been 
employed in a number of studies. Mankiw and Miron (1986) used three-month and six-
month yields for short- and long-term yields respectively, and found that the theoretical 
relation implied by equation 2.8(b) holds for yields (in the US) particularly when interest 
rate targeting was not in use. A latter study by Mishkin ( 1988) also found the relationship 
implied by equation 2.8(b) is useful in predicting movements in the short-term interest 
rate several months into the future. 
2.2.3 Market Efficiency 
The efficiency of a market is related to the way in which prices arc set in the market 
and the information used in setting these prices. It is based on assumptions such as zero 
transaction costs, free information that becomes available to everyone at the same instant 
8 Recall that a negative sign for a implies that long-term instruments command a premium over short-term 
instruments - a positive 8 in equation (2.4) - and vice versa. 
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and symmetric market rationality. In general, a market is deemed efficient if prices fully 
reflect all the available relevant information as it becomes available. A number of 
approaches can be used to gauge the efficiency of the market for government securities. 
First, one can use an approach that is similar to the one used in the market for stocks. In 
this market, efficiency is primarily characterized by existence of a random walk in stock 
prices. The random price behavior implies that successive holding period returns, such as 
daily returns, are also random. For the term structure of interest rates, equation (2.4) can 
be used to explain the relationship between two successive yields. In period t-1 the 
equation is rewritten as 
n-2 
In,t-1 =~(il,t-1 + IEt-lil,t+j)+e 
J=O 
Subtracting equation (2.9) from (2.4) gives 
n-2 




The term in the brackets after the summation sign are the expected one-period rates in 
time t+j with the expectation for the first being formed at time t and for the second at 
time t-1. Under rational expectations the relation E1 i J,t+j= E1_1 i J,t+j+ &t+j holds. This 
reduces equation (2.10) to 
(2.11) 
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As n increases, such as for a long term bond, 1/n becomes smaller while E1i1,1+n-J - i1,1-J is 
also small. The combined effect is to reduce equation (2.11) to approximately 
(2.12) 
This implies that in an efficient treasury securities' market consecutive yields of long-
term instruments display random walk behavior - just like for stocks. This also suggests 
that if the market for long-term instruments is efficient then the variation in long-term 
interest rates is due to expectations only. Pesando (1978 and 1979) tested for the 
relationship in equation (2.12) using Canadian data and found that the random walk 
characteristic does exist for long-term interest rates. He, however, cautions that there is 
no guarantee that short-term rates in an efficient market will conform to the random walk 
behavior. Hambuger and Platt (1975) also cast doubt on the usefulness of this approach 
for short-term interest rates, though they noted that the time series process of the U.S. 
Treasury bill rates is "not far from being a random walk". It is possible that the 
randomness observed is attributable to factors other than simply a market that is efficient. 
For instance, Kugler (1988) observes that the randomness of Treasury yields in part of 
Mankiw and Miran's (1986) study was for post-1915 yields - a period in which interest 
rate targeting was being employed in the US leading to stabilization/smoothening of 
interest rates. Ironically, Mankiw and Miron (1986) found that the expectations 
hypothesis, particularly the presence of significant term premium, failed for the data after 
1915. It was also noted earlier that the use of the random walk approach to test for market 
efficiency is valid as long as the current change in the short rate has a low correlation 
with past short rates (Mishkin, 1980, pp. 410) and term premiums do not vary with time 
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(Pesando 1979, pp. 458). Using primary market data is also susceptible to the limitations 
that a wider time gap between yield observations may have on the random walk behavior. 
The second approach for testing market efficiency is based on a test for joint 
hypothesis involving (1) testing for a particular model of interest rates and (2) testing for 
efficiency of the market based on the specified model. Market efficiency and rational 
expectations are related on the basis that, in forecasting future interest rates, market 
participants rationally employ all available information. Thus, this approach uses the 
basic term structure relationship (such as the one implied by equation 2.4) to test for the 
presence of efficiency. In effect it views the underlying term structure theory and 
efficient [bond] market theory as complementary rather than alternative hypotheses. That 
is, if the data support the theory then the market that generated the data is efficient. This 
approach, which was used by Modigliani and Shiller (1973), is simple in the sense that 
there is no need to develop a separate model to test for efficiency. It is also reinforced by 
the rational behavior of market participants in an efficient market. That is, since the 
market participants have the opportunity to buy any of the offered maturity groups, the 
current and expected future yields in the different groups influence the prices quoted by the 
bidders, which in tum determine the yields. Consequently, the relationship among the 
yields, as contained in, say, the biased expectations theory is one of the factors that can be 
used to gauge market efficiency. The implication of using a variation of the expectations 
hypothesis based on rational expectations is that in an efficient market there is no 
exploitable regularity in the past movement of interest rates and there are no arbitrage 
opportunities. Essentially, this tests at least the weak form of market efficiency. 
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2.3 Interest Rates and Inflation 
Both the Fisher hypothesis and rational expectations point out to the existence of a 
positive relationship between inflation and nominal interest rates. On the other hand, the 
causality in the relationship is not a straightforward issue. While the information 
contained in the term structure is useful in predicting inflation (Mishkin, 1990; and 
Frankel and Lown, 1994), current inflation can also be used to predict nominal interest 
rates. The essence of the Fisher hypothesis and hence the effects of inflation upon the 
nominal interest rate is that lenders allow for the expectations of inflation-induced 
decrease in the real value of the principal. This leads to a relationship of the form 
(2.13) 
Where i1 is the one-period nominal interest rate, 
r is the real interest rate, and 
E 11rt+J is the expected inflation rate for the next period. 
Like future interest rates, Et7rt+J is unobservable and its estimation is possible if economic 
agents possess information to form inflation expectations. The information includes past 
inflation rates, money supply, price level, rate and composition of income (Sargent, 
1972). If the monetary authority employs inflation targeting and it is credible and 
consistent, the periodic inflation targets are also likely to be the main, and possibly the 
only factor used in forming inflation expectations. Using the rational expectation 
assumption, the actual inflation rate observed in the future is used to represent the 
expected inflation such that 
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(2.14) 
Substituting (2.14) into (2.13) and writing as an estimable equation gives 
(2.15) 
The coefficient <I> represents the real interest rate - which is hypothesized to be positive 
and significant - while the coefficient A is, theoretically, not significantly different from 
unity. This relationship was proposed and used by Yohe and Kamosky (1969) who 
sought to explain fluctuations in nominal interest rates solely in terms of variations in 
price expectations. The model was further tested and supported - to a lesser extent - by 
Pesando (1976) using Canadian data despite the fact that there was no indication that the 
Canadian monetary authority employed inflation targeting - at least for the period in 
focus. Wallace and Warner (1993) also found that inflation and interest rates are 
cointergrated hence supporting both the Fisher effect and the expectations theory. These 
findings suggest that looking at how the treasury bills prices are influenced by inflation 
expectations enhances understanding of the structure of the interest rates, market 
efficiency and investors' rationality. 
2.4 Institutional Characteristics of the Treasury Bill Market 
Treasury securities are often used by central banks to manage money supply and 
government debt. In auctions, treasury securities are sold to bidders using uniform price or 
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multiple prices9. The latter can either be 'discriminatory' or a combination of 
discriminatory and uniform prices. In the uniform-price system all successful bidders pay 
the same price, which is the lowest price that clears the market in which the securities are 
sold, while under discriminatory price system bidders pay their respective bids hence 
the common name pay-your-bid system. In the latter, the successful bidders are listed, 
starting with the highest bid price, down to the lowest successful bid price. In addition, 
various combinations of discriminatory and uniform prices are used by some central 
banks. One combination is that used by the Bank of Spain where, for winning bids above 
the average winning bid, buyers are charged the average winning bid, otherwise they pay 
their respective bids. It is important to note that the different systems produce different 
official yields. For example, in the uniform-price system the yield obtained in each auction 
is based on a single price, while under multiple-price system the yield is obtained as the 
weighted average of the yields of all successful bids. This may impact on the relevance of 
some additional information such as the dispersions obtained in the auctions - i.e. the 
difference between the yield implied by highest and the lowest successful prices and the 
yield obtained by lowest successful bids in modeling the term structure as well as testing 
for market efficiency. 
Since its creation in 1966, the BOT has been selling treasury securities on behalf of the 
Government of Tanzania. Prior to 1993, selling of these securities was based on some 
predetermined prices hence giving the buyers a predetermined yield. This was due mainly to 
the fact that most of the potential buyers were government owned institutions and the 
financial system was heavily regulated. In 1992 Tanzania liberalized its financial sector by 
9 The choice of the system to use is essentially the decision of the Treasury, which is the issuing authority. 
For example, while the US uses the uniform price system Canada uses the multiple prices system. 
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allowing private institutions in the banking industry. In line with this, the BOT changed its 
system of selling securities to an auction system based on the use of multiple prices. The 
BOT has been auctioning treasury bills since August 1993. Initially, the auctions were held 
fortnightly but from mid-1994 auctions have been held on weekly basis. Different maturity 
groups have been offered: 35 days, 91 days and 182 days were offered up to early December 
1994 while 91 days, 182 days and 364 days have been sold thereafter. In the last week of 
May 2002 the BOT started issuing the 35-day bills again. The 35- and 91-day Treasury 
bills are used for liquidity management purposes, while the 182, and 364-day treasury 
bills (together with two-year and recently introduced five-year Treasury bonds) are used 
for Government debt management. 
To auction government securities, the BOT uses a multiple-price, sealed-bid auction 
system. It involves the BOT announcing, about one week prior to the auction, the amount of 
debt it plans to sell and inviting bids from prospective buyers subject to a minimum bid size 
with bid prices quoted per 100 Tanzanian Shillings (TZS). Eligible bidders can submit 
multiple competitive sealed bids only: noncompetitive bids are not allowed. Successful bids 
are then awarded on the discriminatory pricing basis. Based on the successful bids, the 
weighted average price, for each maturity group is computed and in tum used to compute 
the annualized weighted average yield. In addition, after each auction, the BOT releases 
some information that may be considered an important input to bidders in subsequent 
auctions. The information includes total amount subscribed, highest and lowest bid prices 
received, minimum successful price and the face value of the amount sold. In the first 
years of the auction system, particularly the 1993 to 1996 period, the yields produced in the 
auctions fluctuated widely (Figure Al.1 and Tables Al.1 to Al.3 in Appendix 1). In this 
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period, though both the yields and inflation rates (Figure Al.2) were high, the yields were 
significantly higher that the inflation rate and experienced wider fluctuations. In the recent 
years, however, both inflation and the yields have been low and they also experience smaller 
fluctuations. Its noteworthy observing that longer maturing bills have higher yields in almost 
all auctions implying that the auctions have been producing upward slopping yield curves. 
In January 1999, the BOT introduced the primary dealership system. 10 In this system 
investors with bids valued at TZS 100.0 million or more are allowed to participate in the 
auctions directly while those with bids valued at less than TZS 100.0 million are expected 
to channel their bids through primary dealers. The primary objective was to simplify the 
issuance and administration of government securities, and to facilitate the development of 
the secondary and inter-bank trading market, thereby enhancing efficiency in liquidity 
management. It was expected that primary dealers, particularly commercial banks, would 
buy securities for "on-selling" to their in-house clients since the securities are neither 
listed nor allowed to be sold on the over-the-counter market of the stock exchange. It was 
also expected that the REPO market - between the BOT and the primary dealers and 
among financial institutions - would also help to enhance the liquidity of treasury 
securities. However, the expectations have not been realized as the original buyers resell 
only a negligible proportion of the securities. In 2000, for example, out of securities 
worth Tanzanian Shillings (TZS) 321.6 billion bought by primary dealers, only securities 
1° Cunently there are 18 registered primary dealers. However it may be considered that the pool of 
investors capable of submitting bids of TZS 100 million has the 18 registered banks, 11 non-bank financial 
institutions and about 80 bureaux as the front-rnnners. Recent data based on October 2002 to February 
2003 auctions indicate that, on average, the treasury bills buyers are made up of deposit money banks 
(75%), pension funds and insurance companies (20%) and non-bank financial institutions (5%) (BOT 
:Vlonthly Economic Reviews, November-December 2002, March 2003) 
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worth TZS 1.07 billion, about 0.3 percent, were transacted in the secondary market (BOT 
Monetary Policy Statement, June 2001). 
It is argued that the institutional factors of the auction process can affect the ability 
the market to fully exploit arbitrage opportunities (Godbout et al. 2002) as well as the 
distribution of auction awards (Pulizzi and Nicholson, 1998). Between uniform price 
auction and pay-your-bid auction, studies have shown that uniform price tend to yield 
higher revenues to the issuer (Heller and Lengwiler 1998) and produce higher dispersions 
of bids but low price volatility overtime (Godbout et al. 2002). In general, the auction 
system used as well as the multiples in which bids come impact not only the issuer's cost 
of borrowing but also has effect on the performance of the expectations theory of the 
term structure and the market efficiency (Godbout et al. 2002). It is not the primary 
purpose of this study to carry out a critical evaluation of auction systems. However, 
understanding the auction system that produce the yields used in this study is important in 
the interpretation of the results. 
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CHAPTER3 
MODELLING PROCEDURE AND DATA 
3.1 The Methodology 
In this study a period is defined in terms of three months with the yields to maturity 
on 91-, 182-, and 364-day Treasury bills representing one-, two- and four-period yields 
respectively. These will also often be referred to as three-month, six-month and one-year 
yields respectively. 
Using the approach applied in equations (2.5a) through (2.8b ), the equation for the 
relationship between three- and six-month yields is 
(3.1) 
Where i1, and hare yields to maturity on 91-, and 182-day Treasury bills respectively. 
The expectations horizon in this equation is three months and the error term z1 is realized 
three months latter. Thus, using equation 2.5 and denoting the short-term interest rate 
expectations error as Et+ 1 = E1i1+ 1 - it+ 1, the error terms in the equation has the form Zt = 
Et+!. 
The relationship between six- and twelve-month yields is essentially a two period 
model but with expectations horizon of six months. Its equation is given as 
(3.2) 
Where i2, and 14 are yields to maturity on 182-, and 364-day Treasury bills respectively. 
The error term is realized six months latter and has the form Zt = Et+2. The coefficient ~ in 
both 3 .1 and 3 .2 is expected to be positive and not significantly different from 2. 
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A similar approach to the one used above is used to develop an estimable equation 
for the relationship between three- and twelve-month yields. However, some few 
manipulations are involved to make the spread between the short- and long-term yields 
the independent variable. It starts with an equation similar to 2.4 with the general 
formulation being 
(3.3a) 
This is rearranged as 
(3.3b) 
Subtracting 4i1,t from both sides and imposing the rational expectations assumption gives 
(3.3c) 
Writing as an estimable equation and using z1 to represent the sum of the error terms 
gives 
(3.3d) 
The error term z1 is realized in installments - three-, six and nine-months latter - making 
nine months the longest expectations horizon in this equation. The coefficient ~ is 
expected to be positive and not significantly different from 4. 
Three things are common in equations 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3d. First, the independent 
variable is the yield spread between longer- and shorter-term yield observable at time t. 
Second, the error terms represent the sum of expectation errors for future short-term 
yields and is realized over the expectations horizon in the respective equation. Third, 
based on the discussion in Chapter 2, a, which represents the term premium, is expected 
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to be negative and significantly different from zero. Assuming the term premium 
increases monotonically with maturity, then the longer the expectations horizon the 
higher the absolute value of a. 
The relationship between inflation and nominal interest rates is tested using the 91-
day and 182-day yields only. The equations are 
(3.4) 
(3.5) 
Where i1,t and i2,1 are the yields on 91- and 182-day treasury bill respectively, and 
n1,1+1 and n2,t+2 are the change in price level for the next three and six 
months. 
With a real yield that is constant o 
ver the length to maturity, <I> is expected to be positive and significant. If the Fisher 
effect - that nominal interest rates move one-for-one with inflation - holds, then the 
coefficient A should not be significantly different from unity. On the other hand, if A is 
only significantly different from zero it will suggest that the yields contain significant 
information about inflation expectations even when the Fisher effect does not hold on 
one-to-one basis. 
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3.2 Data Type and Sources 
The data used in this study are the annualized yields obtained from weekly Treasury 
bill auctions and the month-to-month inflation rates both of which are published by the 
BOT. The overall sample for the term structure and testing for market efficiency consists 
of264 weekly yield curve observations from June 1998 (auction 216) through January 
2003 (auction 479). The choice of the sample period is dictated by two main factors. First, 
the sample period starts about five years after the BOT started using the auction system to 
allow reasonable time for the market to experience smooth operations. This is key to the 
imposition of a rational expectations assumption. It is highly likely that the phenomenon 
of treasury bills buyers having expectations that are not rational was prevalent at the 
onset of the auction system. However, this phenomenon would be expected to disappear 
or at least fall to insignificant levels in the long run. Second, for consistency, the sample 
covers a period where most of the trading was through primary dealers and where all the 
three maturities have been on issue simultaneously. This is also the period where the 
BOT has been maintaining a comprehensive data bank of auction results that made it 
possible to compute the LSPY used in this study. For each of equations 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3d, 
the sample is the longest possible that can be extracted from the overall sample period based 
on the requirements for the specific equation. It is noteworthy pointing out that the auction 
system used by the BOT makes the WAY the reported yield. The LSPY is not directly 
reported but the lowest successful price is included in the information release after each 
auction. For the purpose of this study, this price is used to compute the LSPY for each 
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auction using the same approach as that used by the BOT when computing WAY from 
the weighted average price 11 . The lowest successful price would have been the price on 
which the official yield is based if the unifom1 price system was in use. In addition, this 
price can be viewed as the one paid by the better-informed buyers who are focusing on 
buying the Treasury bills while at the same time avoid paying a price that is too much. 
These buyers consider all available information and try to exploit any market 
imperfections that may arise from information asymmetry. 
The annualised three- and six-month inflation rates are computed by compounding 
and annualising one-month seasonally adjusted headline inflation rates. Headline 
inflation is the change in the overall consumer price index covering both food and non-
food prices (see also Figure Al.2 in appendix 1 for the different indices). Annualisation 
and compounding is necessary because the one-month rates published by the BOT are 
"month-to-month" rates that are not annualised. To synchronize the yields and inflation 
rates, the relationship between the yields and inflation rates is tested using the yields 
observed at a date close the beginning of each calendar month for the period from June 
1998 to July 2002. This allows for matching Treasury bill maturities with the duration 
used in computing monthly inflation. 
11 With bid size of TZS 100, the annualized yields are computed as Yield 1 OO - p * } 65 * 100 
p D 
where Yield represents WAY or LSPY 
P is the weighted average price and lowest successful price for WAY and LSPY respectively and 




4.1 An Overview of the Data Used 
The yield and inflation rate data for June 1998 to January 2003 are plotted in figures 
4.1 to 4.3. In general a declining trend is observed. This is largely explained by the 
commitment of the central bank to lower inflation from more than 30 percent in 1995 to 
about 5 percent in the early 2000s (see figure Al .2 in Appendix 1 ). Reforms in the 
financial sector have also enhanced competition in the Treasury bill market. 
The data plots suggest that yields obtained in the earlier auctions were more volatile 
than those in the more recent auctions. For both WAY and LSPY an evident change in 
the level and volatility occurs around May/June 2000. The BOT's publications (Monthly 
and Quarterly Economic Reviews) do not offer an insight as to the cause of the wide 
fluctuations in yields particularly in the June 1999 to May 2000 period. There was no 
change in the BOT's management and, interestingly, deposit rates and indicators such as 
exchange rates and inflation rates did not experience such wide fluctuations. 
A Chow test was used to establish whether the underlying process is the same across 
all observations in the sample. The test was based on the time series nature of the data to 
determine the evidence of a structural shift over time. The most significant statistics were 
found to be present on May 31 2000 ( auction 341 ). The F statistics at this date were 
72.29, 58.72 and 92.84 for 91-, 182- and 364-day Treasury bills respectively giving 
insignificant p-values. This evidence is the criteria used to split the data into two sub-
samples. 
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Tables 4.1 and 4.2 present summary statistics for the two sub-samples. Splitting the data 
has lowered the volatility substantially resulting into the sub-samples having standard 
deviations that are substantially lower than the standard deviations for the entire sample 
(columns 2, 5, and 8). On the other hand, the June 1998 to May 2000 period still has 
standard deviations that are significantly larger ( columns 3, 6, and 9) than those in the 
June 2000 to October 2002 period ( columns 4, 7, and 10) for both WAY and LSPY. It is 
interesting to note that the coefficients of variation, which measure volatility in relative 
terms, are higher in the June 2000 to October 2002 period than in the June 1998 to May 
2000 period. Lower volatility for the sub-samples also has some effects in estimation of 
the coefficients with initial tests showing that the split data is more homoscedastic 
compared to that for the entire sample period. 
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Table 4.1: Summary statistics for weighted average yields (WAY) 
Maturity 91- days 182- days 364- days 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Sample 98.6- 98.6- 00.6- 98.6- 98.6- 00.6- 98.6- 98.6- 00.6-
Period (yr:m) 02.10 00.5 02.10 02.10 00.5 02.10 02.10 00.5 02.10 
:\' 230 105 125 230 105 125 230 105 125 
Low 2.02 5.45 2.02 2.54 6.32 2.54 3.00 8.97 3.00 
High 16.52 16.52 8.42 16.96 16.96 10.00 17.62 17.62 11.21 
Mean 7.65 11.43 4.47 8.51 12.53 5.14 9.68 13.98 6.07 
Standard 
Deviation 4.19 3.11 1.44 4.50 3.35 1.71 4.55 2.55 2.00 
Coefficient of 
Variation 0.55 0.27 0.32 0.53 0.27 0.33 0.47 0.18 0.33 
Source: Bank of Tanzania and o,vn computations 
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Table 4.2: Summary statistics for lowest successful price yields (LSPY) 
\1aturity 91- days 182- days 364- days 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Sample 98.6- 98.6 - 00.6- 98.6- 98.6- 00.6- 98.6- 98.6- 00.6-
Period 02.10 00.5 02.10 02.10 00.5 02.10 02.10 00.5 02.10 
N 230 105 125 230 105 125 230 105 125 
Low 2.26 5.61 2.26 2.81 6.39 2.81 3.30 8.96 3.30 
High 25.60 25.60 9.23 35.11 35.11 10.96 20.54 20.54 11.89 
Mean 8.62 13.09 4.87 9.32 13.88 5.49 10.14 14.67 6.33 
Standard 
Deviation 5.03 3.93 1.62 5.31 4.41 1.86 4.84 2.85 2.10 
Coefficient 
of Variation 0.58 0.30 0.33 0.57 0.32 0.34 0.48 0.19 0.33 
Source: Bank of Tanzania and own computations 
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The plot of 3- and 6-month forward inflation rates (Figure 4.3) shows a declining 
trend and volatility level that does not change substantially throughout the sample period. 
Table 4.3 also shows that splitting the sample lowers the standard deviation in the second 
part of the sample (columns 4 and 7) but not in the first part (columns 3 and 6). Unlike 
the WAY where 3-month yields are always lower than 6-month yields, three-month 
inflation rates are not always lower than six-month inflation rates. Based on the 
coefficient of variations, the relative volatility for the yields seems to be comparable for 
the split data. However, while the averages show that 6-month yields are higher than 6-
month inflation rates in both sub-samples, (columns 6 and 7 in Tables 4.1 and 4.3), the 3-
month yields are higher than 3-month inflation rates in the first sub-sample ( columns 3 
Tables 4.1 and 4.3) but not in the second. 
Though the shift in the inflation rate is not as evident as that for the yields, splitting 
the data into two parts was done using the same cut off as that for the yields for 
comparison purposes. The limited number of observations in the sub-samples calls for 
attention in interpreting the resulting estimates, particularly the standard errors. The use 
of small samples is not uncommon. In generating yield curve estimates, Gray (1973) 
based the estimates on sample size ranging from 22 to 44. Though no mention is made of 
specific adjustments, it is prudent to assume that the standard errors of the estimates are 
adjusted to account for the properties of small samples. 
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Figure 4.3: Annualized inflation rate 3- and 6-month into the future 
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Table 4.3: Summary statistics for forward inflation rates 
3-months 6-months 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Sample Period 98.6- 98.6- 00.6- 98.6- 98.6- 00.6-
02.10 00.5 02.10 02.10 00.5 02.10 
N 50 25 25 50 25 25 
Low 2.80 4.01 2.80 3.62 4.23 3.62 
High 12.52 12.53 9.27 12.51 12.51 7.92 
Mean 6.62 8.01 5.24 6.32 7.58 5.06 
Standard 
Deviation 2.64 2.71 1.71 1.98 1.97 0.92 
Coefficient of 
Variation 0.40 0.34 0.33 0.31 0.26 0.18 
Source: Bank of Tanzania and own computations 
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4.2 Initial Data Analysis 
The data were analyzed using the SAS statistics software. First a regression using 
maximum likelihood method was used to estimate the parameters for the equations 
developed in chapter 3 for the entire data set and for the sub-samples. The robustness of 
the initial estimates was primarily based on testing the resulting error terms for the 
presence of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity12 . The Durbin-Watson statistic was 
used to test for the presence of autocorrelation while White's test and the Breusch-Pagan 
statistic are used to test for conditional heteroscedasticity. In all tests the significance 
level is set at 10 percent. For the entire sample, the residuals for the term structure 
equations showed the presence of autocorrelation - notably first order - for both WAY 
and LSPY. On the other hand, all three equations were found to have heteroscedastic 
residuals when WAY is used but not when using LSPY. In addition, a plot of the 
residuals from WAY estimates against time shows that the variances are not constant; 
they decrease over time. Based on the split data, autocorrelated residuals are found in all 
of the initial estimates while heteroscedasticity is found in two sub-samples when using 
WAY and in one sub-sample when using LSPY. For all possible combination of the term 
structure relations none has residuals that are neither autocorrelated nor heteroscedastic. 
For the relationship between the yields and inflation, the observation on autocorrelation 
and heteroscedasticity is somehow different. Of the 18 relationships (based on sample 
type, yield type and equations 3 .4 to 3 .6) three have residuals that are neither 
autocorrelated nor heteroscedastic while only one has residuals that are both 
autocorrelated and heteroscedastic. 
12 Only the adjusted estimates, on which the discussions are based, are presented in the findings 
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The findings of autocorrelated and heteroscedastic residuals are an unsurprising 
phenomenal since the equations are base on the use of rational expectations. This is 
coupled with the fact that the yields and inflation rates are not only a set of jointly 
distributed random variables indexed in time but also are essentially time series realized 
from a stochastic process. As a result, the error terms in the estimated equations are 
realized at a latter period and hence the serial correlation. Addressing the problems takes 
the following approach. A model whose variables are indexed on time can be presented 
as 
(4.1) 
where the error term, Zt, behave as a time series variable. This implies that Zt contains 
information about Y1 and needs to be identified and modeled as an autoregressive 
integrated moving average (ARIMA) process. If Zt, is identified as having a/h order 
autocorrelation it can be expressed as 
(4.2) 
This gives an autoregressive model [AR(j)] of a form 
(4.3) 
Heteroscedastic variance implies that the error term f 1 in equation 4.3 is not independent 
of Xi. However, the variance is unknown and must be estimated from the data. If ft is 
assumed to be exponential heteroscedastic, then the variance has a form 
(4.4) 
q p 
Where h =w+ ~B& 2 . + ~r h 
t L..,,,; 1 t-1 L..,,,; m t-m 
i=l m=l 
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The resulting model is an exponential generalized autoregressive conditional 
heteroscedasticity (EGARCH) model that combines a / 1 order autoregressive error model 
with the GARCH(p,q) variance model. These adjustments are used to re-estimate the 
equations with the adjustment for each data set being based on the initial findings for 
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. 
The order of autocorrelation was determined by using BACKS TEP (backward 
elimination) option in the SAS code rather than simple AR identification. The equations 
were estimated using different lag length specifications ranging from 2 to 13. Higher 
level oflag-length specification (beyond lag 13) was avoided as it was found not to 
change the parameter estimates significantly. On the other hand, particular attention was 
paid to lags 4, 7 and 13 in case of the presence of seasonal pattern in the data. Adjustment 
for conditional heteroscedasticity was based on ARCH model and, where appropriate, 
exponential GARCH model was used based on an assumption that the variance has an 
exponential form. The GARCH specification is restricted to GARCH (1,1) or lower. The 
main focus was on algorithms that converge, stable parameter estimates and estimates 
that have the least autoregressive residuals. 
4.3 Results on the Term Structure and the Forecasting Power of the Spread 
The results for the term structure estimates adjusted for the presence of 
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity are presented in tables 4.4 to 4.6. The results are 
discussed in two parts with the first part covering the findings on the term-premium and 
the second covering the slope of the yield curve and the forecasting power of the spread. 
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4.3.1 The Term Premium 
Table 4.4 shows that, based on the entire sample, a is of the expected sign and 
significantly different from zero for both WAY and LSPY only in the relationship using 
three- and twelve-month yields ( columns 3, and 7). This supports the presence of a 
positive maturity premium for WAY (at 1 percent) and LSPY (at 10 percent). In addition, 
the relationship using six- and twelve-month LSPY indicates the presence of a positive 
maturity premium at 10 percent (column 6). 
A clearer picture is revealed by the split data. For the June 1998 through May 2000 
period, the yields do not show the presence of a term premium ( a is not significant) for 
any of the three equations irrespective of the type of yields used (columns 2, 4 and 6 in 
tables 4.5 and 4.6). Term premium is also absent for the June 2000 through October 2002 
period when six-month yields are used as long-term yields (column 3 in tables 4.5 and 
4.6). When 12-month yields are used as long-term yields both WAY and LSPY have term 
premium that are significant. The LSPY fare better than WAY with both term premia 
being significant at a 1 percent ( columns 5 and 7 in tables 4.6). The presence of 
significant term premia means the hypothesis that longer maturing bills are riskier cannot 
be rejected. This is of significant importance in the absence of secondary market where 
buyers face increased uncertainty as they hold the bills until they mature. The assumption 
of monotonically increasing term premium also seem to hold whereby the equations with 
9-month expectation horizon (columns 5 Table 4.5 and 4.6) have term premia that are 
larger, in absolute terms, than those for equations with 6-month expectations horizon 
(columns 7 Table 4.5 and 4.6). 
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Table 4.4: Regression of the change in short-term yields on the spread between long-
and short-term rates for the entire sample period (98.6 ~ 02.10) 
Yield type WAY LSPY 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Months (s,1) (3,6) (3, 12) (6,12) (3,6) (3,12) (6,12) 
N 230 204 217 230 204 217 
a 0.002 -0.044* -0.018 -0.0073 -0.08*** -0.023*** 
(0.003) (0.013) (0.019) (0.01) (0.047) (0.0137) 
(3 0.317* 1.999* 0.8780* 0.3782* 2.62* 1.0453* 
(0.047) (0.158) (0.127) (0.0655) (0.158) (0.0842) 
D.W 1.7695 2.0197 1.6218 1.9881 2.0650 2.1162 
R2 0.0661 0.3695 0.1843 0.1318 0.5974 0.42 
s = months for short-term yield, 1 = months for long-term yield 
Standard enors are in parentheses 
*, **,***Significant at 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively 
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Table 4.5: Regression of the change in short-term yields on the spread between long-
and short-term rates using WAY 
Months (s,l) (3,6) (3,12) (6,12) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Period (yr.m) 98.6-00.5 00.6-02.10 98.6-00.5 00.6-02.5 98.6-00.5 00.6-02.7 
N 105 125 105 99 105 112 
a -0.006 -0.004 -0.086 -0.109* -0.002 -0.015** 
(0.018) (0.0056) (0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.006) 
(3 0.34** 0.41* 2.656* 2.0934* 0.584* 0.768* 
(0.13) (0.091) (0.2235) (0.192) (0.103) (0.1254) 
D.W 1.8792 2.0143 1.5968 1.5662 2.0025 2.0599 
R2 0.0612 0.1423 0.2969 0.4697 0.1708 0.2588 
s = months for short-term yield, 1 = months for long-term yield 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*, **,***Significant at 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively 
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Table 4.6: Regression of the change in short-term yields on the spread between short-
and long-term yields using LSPY 
Months (s,l) (3,6) (3, 12) ( 6, 12) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Period (yr.m) 98.6-00.5 00.6-02.10 98.6-00.5 00.6-02.5 98.6-00.5 00.6-02.7 
N 105 125 105 99 105 112 
a -0.013 -0.0074 -0.l -0.059* -0.032 -0.015* 
(0.0152) (0.0049) (0.078) (0.0206) (0.028) (0.005) 
{3 0.3593* 0.7149* 2.6698* 2.0358* 1.0563* 0.5877* 
(0.094) (0.128) (0.209) (0.2787) (0.084) (0.138) 
D.W 1.9941 1.9241 2.0048 1.8238 2.0251 2.0260 
R2 0.1289 0.1591 0.6186 0.3584 0.6115 0.0004 
s = months for short-term yield, 1 = months for long-term yield 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*, **, *** Significant at 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively 
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The absence of term premia in the June 1998 through May 2000 period is consistent 
with both the level effect (Nelson, 1972) and volatility effect (Browne and Manasse, 
1989; Longstaff and Schwartz, 1992; Brenner et al.; 1996). Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show that 
both the level and volatility of the yields in this period are higher than in the June 2000 
through October 2002 period. Nelson (1972) found that, other things being equal, the 
term premium should be less, the higher the interest rate while Longstaff and Schwartz 
(1992) observed that the change in the short-term rate depends on both the level of the 
current short-term rates and their volatility. High absolute variability in this case is likely 
to affect the predictability of short-term rates hence making them less useful in 
forecasting long-term rates. 
4.3.2 The Slope of the Yield Curve and the Forecasting Power of the Spread 
In all but one equation, (3 is positive and significantly different from zero at 1 
percent. The exception is for the 3-months expectation horizon using WAY (Table 4.5 
column 2), which is significant at 5 percent. The coefficient is also larger under LSPY 
than under WAY in all but two equations ( columns 5 and 7, Table 4.5 versus columns 5 
and 7, Table 4.6). The significance of this coefficient implies that there is a positive 
relationship between long- and short-term yields and that the current spread between 
long- and short-term yields is useful in the prediction of future short-term yields. 
Overall, the relationship between the spread and change in short-term yields seems to 
hold better over longer maturity [(3,12) and (6,12)] than shorter maturity [(3,6)] and that 
the slope is greater under LSPY than under WAY. The former stands in contrast to 
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Browne and Manasse (1989) who found that the forecasting ability of the term structure 
fades as yields on assets of increasingly distant maturities are employed as long-rates. On 
the other hand, however, the presence of significant term premia for equations with 6-
and 9-months expectations horizon but not for those with 3-months expectations horizon 
as well as monotonically increasing term premia support the argument that the longer the 
maturity the higher the term premium. Thus, the term premium is not only related to the 
time-to-maturity but also to the length of the expectations horizon. 
For all equations, the coefficients of the yield curves though positive and significant, 
fall short of the hypothesized values. This has been a common observation in most term 
structure studies. Such observation should be construed to imply that although the data do 
not fully confirm the expectations theory, the slope of the yield curve does contain 
substantial information on the path of the short rate. Mankiw and Miron (1986) argue that 
a slope that is significant but short of the hypothesized values is sufficient to convey the 
basic message. That is, the yield-spread variation is related to subsequent movement in 
short-term yields and does forecast part of the expected change in the short-term yields. 
In addition, one has to bear in mind that the slope is susceptible to the trend of the 
economy and the extent to which short-term rate expectations are used in forecasting 
long-term rates. The predictive power of the spread, however, does not seem to get much 
support from the equations' R-squares, which are small. Though small R2s have been 
observed in a number of studies on term structure of interest rates ( see for example 
Shiller, 1973; Mankiw and Mirron, 1986; Mishkin, 1988; and Kugler, 1988), they call the 
theory into question especially with slopes that fall short of the hypothesized values. 
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Mankiw and Mirron (1986), for example, found small R2 mainly in cases where the 
expectations theory is rejected. 
4.4 Results on Interest Rate and Inflation 
This section focuses on testing the Fisher effect based on both three- and six-month 
yields and forward inflation rates. Tables 4.7 to 4.9 present the results for the estimates 
adjusted for the presence of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. 
For the entire sample (Table 4.7), the Fisher effect equations suggest the presence of 
positive real interest rate with <I> being of the expected positive sign and significantly 
different from zero. On the other hand the coefficient of the inflation rate, )\, is not 
significantly different from zero suggesting that the yields, and by implications the 
bidders, do not take inflation expectations into account. 
Like the term structure equations, the split data provide clearer results. A positive 
and significant real yield is observed in all sub-samples when WAY is used with <I> that is 
positive and significantly different from zero (Table 4.8). The same is observed when 
LSPY are used except for the six-month Fisher effect model for the June 2000 to July 
2002 period (column 5, Table 4.9). In all samples, the coefficient for inflation rate,)\, is 
significantly different from zero for the June 2000 to July 2002 period for both yields 
with LSPY having higher coefficients. 
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Table 4.7: Relationship between yields and expected inflation for the entire sample 
period 
Yield type WAY LSPY 
1 2 3 4 5 
Model Fisher Fisher Fisher Fisher effect 
effect (3- effect ( 6- effect (3- (6-month) 
month) month) month) 
N 50 50 50 50 
q> 0.0880* 0.0927** 0.1 * 0.116* 
(0.025) (0.035) (0.03) (0.040) 
-0.1494 -0.1327 -0.0782 -0.2768 
(0.123) (0.254) (0.249) (0.38) 
D.W 1.9964 1.6513 2.4520 2.3037 
R2 0.0337 0.0064 0.0021 0.0032 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*, **, ** * Significant at 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively 
56 
Table 4.8: Relationship between WAY and expected inflation 
Model Fisher Effect (3 months) Fisher Effect (6 months) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Period (yr.m) 98.6-00.5 00.6-02.7 98.6-00.5 00.6-02.7 
N 24 26 24 26 
q> 0.1383* 0.015** 0.132* 0.0258* 
(0.025) (0.006) (0.014) (0.008) 
-0.354*** 0.6031 * -0.239 0.4466* 
(0.186) (0.111) (0.178) (0.118) 
D.W 1.209 1.515 1.349 1.019 
R2 0.148 0.563 0.0785 0.0616 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*, **,***Significant at 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively 
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Table 4.9: Relationship between LSPY and expected inflation 
Model Fisher Effect (3 months) Fis her Effect ( 6 months) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Period (yT.m) 98.6-00.5 00.6-02.7 98.6--00.5 00.6-02.7 
~ 24 26 24 26 
<p 0.126* 0.0161 ** 0.117* -0.008 
(0.023) (0.0066) (0.033) (0.014) 
0.091 0.656* 0.1047 1.3* 
(0.271) (0.1209) (0.4279 (0.277) 
D.W 1.253 1.833 1.556 1.548 
R2 0.0049 0.5615 0.003 0.49 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*, **, *** Significant at 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively 
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Overall, the Fisher effect holds in the June 2000 to July 2002 period, though not on 
one-to-one basis. This is the period where both the inflation rates and the yields are low 
and experience low fluctuations. Again this suggests that the predictability of future 
inflation rates is enhanced with low inflation rates and low volatility. Also, the LSPY 
seem to provide better results supporting the idea that bidders quoting the minimum 
successful price are more informed: they not only consider inflation rate but the also 
consider any available information including the existence of market imperfections. 
One argument is useful in explaining why the Fisher effect model based on the yields 
and inflation observed in Tanzania fail to holds on one-to-one. Inflation is an aggregate 
measure and the resulting number does not have the same effect on all economic agents. 
Some facts about the weights in the headline inflation and the Treasury bill buyers help to 
explain this. First, this study has used the headline inflation which covers both food and 
non-food prices. The weight of food items in the basket used in computing headline 
inflation in Tanzania is 71.2 percent. Second, banks, which account for more than 75 
percent of the trading volume in the Treasury bill market, lend mainly to manufacturers 
and traders in the non-food sector. They are also the key players in the foreign currency 
market. Third, deposit rates offered by banks are low and for some time they have been 
below the inflation rate. For example, in the period from October 2000 through April 
2002, savings deposit rates were below the headline inflation rate (BOT Monthly 
Economic Report, April-May 2002, pp.12), while for the June 2002 through March 2003 
period, both savings deposit rates and time deposit rates were below the headline inflation 
(BOT Monthly Economic Report, April 2003). The combined effects of these facts 
suggest that the inflation rates used here may be less useful to both depositors and the 
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banks. Thus, the Treasury bill buyers may be relying more on other numbers such as the 
non food inflation and the change in the value of the local currency. This argument is 
somehow supported by the BOT which, in its 2001 monetary policy statement, stated that 
its policy focus is on the consumer price index excluding food prices (the non-food 
inflation) rather than the overall (headline) inflation. 
" ... This is because food prices are mainly affected by non-monetary factors like 
droughts, floods etc. which monetary policy cannot control. ... Thus the Non-food 
Inflation rate is a measure of price movements, largely caused by policy factors. It is 
an important measure, which monitors more accurately, the effectiveness of 
monetary policy on inflation (BOT, Monetary Policy Statement, June 2001 pp.6). 13 
The similarity between the observations when testing the expectations theory and 
those from the relationship between the yields and inflation is attributable to a number of 
factors. First, there is the increase in the credibility of the central bank starting from the 
new Bank of Tanzania Act in 1995 and significantly enhanced by the appointment of a 
new Governor in 1998. The inclusion in the new Act of a provision for controlling 
inflation as the principal objective of the BOT had effects on both the inflation and the 
yields. Second, the failure by the yields to reflect fully inflation may be related to the 
objectives of treasury bills buyers. Most of the Treasury bill buyers are depository 
institutions buying Treasury bills for their own accounts rather than for selling to their 
clients. In this case, one of their main considerations is the margin between the yields and 
the deposit rates, which are also considered to be short-term rates. For most part of the 
sample period these rates have not only been low but have also been below the inflation 
13 Since non-food inflation data is only available from 1999, headline inflation was used throughout the 
sample period to ensure consistency. 
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rate (BOT Monthly Economic Review, April-May 2002, April 2003). This provides a 
room for the bidders to be 'competitive' and submit bids that result to low yields but 
which are above the deposit rate. Low yields, particularly for short-term bills, are also 
likely to be acceptable when the bills are used as a temporary store of funds. Finally, it 
seems that Treasury bill buyers consider inflation when it is low but when it is high they 
tend to ignore it. This is probably because high inflation rates are also likely to be 
characterized by high absolute variability, which makes future inflation rates less 
predictable and, in effect, less useful predictor of nominal yields. 
4.5 Comparison of WAY and LSPY Results 
Earlier, it was argued that bidders quoting the lowest successful price are likely to be 
more informed and they also seek to exploit any arbitrage opportunities arising from 
existence of market imperfections. In the long run, the presence, in a market, of 
participants seeking to exploit arbitrage opportunities enhances efficiency. Thus, it is 
expected that the yields earned by this group of bidders, the LSPY, produce more 
satisfactory results than the WAY. To a large extent this is supported by the findings in 
this study. Comparison of the results in tables 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 shows that, in the 
estimating the term structure equations, LSPY has term premia that are significant at 
higher level of confidence; the yield curves have higher slope in seven of nine cases; and 
the equations have higher R2s in seven of the nine cases. The initial estimates (before 
adjustments) also showed that models estimated using the LSPY had residuals that were 
more independent of the explanatory variable. The two yields do not produce different 
results across the different tem1 structure estimations. In addition to not showing 
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significant term premium for the June 1998 through May 2000 period both do not show 
significant term premium for short expectation horizon (three months) for the June 2000 
through October 2002 period. 
The superiority of the result from the LSPY over those from the WAY can also be 
used to support the argument that bid shading is not a common practice in the treasury 
securities auction. Studies have shown that the use of discriminatory pricing system in 
sealed-bid auctions tends to encourage bidders to deliberately lower their bids below the 
true values they place on the item being auctioned (Chari and Webber, 1992; Nautz and 
Wolfstetter, 1997; Laffont, 1997). This practice -known as bid shading- is intended to 
ensure that a bidder pays the least price when awarded the auctioned item. This is 
because the price paid by a bidder depends on that bidder's bid and bidders do not want to 
pay a price that is too much. In a market where bid shading is prevalent it may be 
expected that the lowest successful prices contain little information about the true 
valuation of the securities hence making LSPY less useful in term structure estimation. 
The findings in this study suggest that this may not be the case in Tanzania. 
While it is not possible to stop bid shading, mechanisms can be put in place to ensure 
that the lowest successful price is not affected much by the practice. Restriction on the 
ability of bidders to submit multiple bids and having minimum bid price are some of the 
measures that can be used to limit the effect of bid shading. The LSPY results suggest 
that the BOT has some mechanisms in place and somehow they are effective. For 
example, a cursory look at the after-auction data shows that in several occasions the BOT 
award securities of amount smaller than those offered even when an offer is 
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oversubscribed. While having such mechanisms in place is useful, care needs to be taken 
to ensure that they do not adversely affect the efficiency of the market. 
4.6 Plausibility of the Underlying Theories and Market Efficiency 
Breaking the theory into separate components does help understanding the 
implications of the results in relation to the biased expectations theory. First, the theory is 
split into the term premium part and the pure expectations part. The premium component 
has to do with the perceived riskness of the longer-maturing bills while the pure 
expectations component is related to the slope of the yield curve. The pure expectations 
element is further analyzed as emanating from two aspects that are also the underlying 
assumptions. The first is the use of short-term yields - both present and forecasted - to 
derive long-term yields. The second is the evolution of short-term yields where rational 
expectations are present. This implicitly posits that market participants use a model that 
leads to random forecasting errors. 
The significant term premium observed in this study does not necessarily lead to the 
overall acceptance of the biased expectations theory. It only tells that for the sample 
period Treasury bill buyers considered longer-maturing bills riskier than shorter-maturing 
bills. The riskness, in this case, is most likely due to the fact that buyers face increased 
uncertainty as they held the bills longer (until they mature) in the absence of a secondary 
market. The premium may also reflect that long-term bills lack the non-pecuniary yield 
earned by short-term bills. That is, lower yield for short-term bills are likely to be 
acceptable if short-term bills are used as a temporary store of funds, probably, while 
waiting for better investment opporhmities. In Tanzania primary dealers are mainly banks 
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and they may be willing to accept lower yields as long as they are above deposit rates. 
Observing a significant term premium, however, gives some indication of market 
efficiency. In the absence of a secondary market Treasury bill buyers are expected to 
demand a premium when buying longer-maturing bills, if the market is efficient. 
The combined effect of the two aspects of the pure expectation part is that if the 
short-term yields were the sole determinants of the long-term yields and evolved in a 
manner that is rational, then there would be no arbitrage opportunities in the market. The 
joint hypothesis nature of the theory is probably the key factor responsible for the 
rejection of the theory because the two aspects are rarely examined in isolation. 
Following the view held by Sargent (1972) that it is difficult to maintain both that only 
expectations about short-term rates determine the yield curve and that expectations are 
rational in the sense of efficiently incorporating available information, an attempt is made 
here to develop a theoretical analysis of the two aspects separately. Thus, the failure of 
the data to confirm fully the expectations theory - specifically the absence of a slope that 
is equal to the hypothesized value - is analyzed by looking at each aspect separately 
while assuming that the other aspect holds. 
The observation in this study of yield curves with slopes that are significantly below 
the hypothesized values is interpreted as follows. First, short-term yields, assuming that 
they are the sole determinant of long-term yields, evolve in a manner that is not rational. 
Having a yield curve that has a slope that is lower than hypothesized value while 
maintaining that only short-term yields are used to derive long-term yields implies that 
market participants' expectations consistently overstate future short-term rates. As a result 
the current long-term rates are also overstated while the ex-post future realization of the 
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short-term yields are below the expectations. Arbitrage opportunities exist and, assuming 
no other assets, investors are better off by buying long-term bills and holding them to 
maturity rather that buying and rolling over short-term bills. The idea that a market 
consistently overestimates future short-term yields is highly unlikely since market 
participants can be expected to adjust their forecasts based on the realized forecasting 
errors. Also, consistent overestimation indicates a problem with the expectations 
formation process - which precludes the rational expectations assumption - while 
arbitrage opportunity can only exist for short time as market forces work to wipe out 
possible profits. Consequently, in the long run, if short-term yields are used as the sole 
determinant of the long-term yields, there are no arbitrage opportunities in the market and 
the coefficients of the yield curves would be equal to the hypothesized values. 
The second part of the interpretation is that market participants do not consider the 
expected short-term yields as the sole determinant oflong-term yields. Short- and long-
term yields may, in fact, bear little direct relationship even though both may be 
determined from closely related information. This allows for the slope of the yield curve 
to be different from the hypothesized value and is the key to the interpretation of negative 
slopes that have been observed when recession is expected. 
The separate analysis shows that the rejection of the expectations theory of the term 
structure is more related to the rejection of the former aspect- that the current and 
expected short-term yields are the sole determinant oflong-term yields - rather than the 
latter - that expectations on short-term yields are rational. The idea that short-term yields 
are used to determine long-term rate but are not the sole determinant has a number of 
implications. First, it does not preclude the rational expectations assumption. Maintaining 
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rational expectations is, rather, related to existence of short-term rates that are highly 
predictable (Mankiw and Mirron, 1986). One issue that most studies seem to 
conveniently avoid is the simultaneity of the short- and long-term yields observed at a 
given point of time. The expectations hypothesis assumes that, at time t, the current 
short-term yield is known and this yield, together with the expected future short-term 
yields, are used to determine the long-term yield. This assumption has a weakness in the 
sense that both the short- and the long-term yields observed at time tare simultaneously 
determined. In a given auction, for example, bidders do not know the yield on a 91-day 
bill when deciding the bid price for a 364-day bill. Both yields are known after the 
auction. Thus, when deciding the bid price for a longer maturing bill, the current short-
term yield is, at best, an expectational value. It follows that the assumption on 
expectations needs to extend to what is considered the current short-term yield. This, of 
course, does not change the results, particularly under rational expectation assumption, 
but helps to clear any misconception that the current short-term rate is observed before 
the current long-term rate. 
Second, it recognizes that other factors have a direct influence on the long-term rates. 
For example, the assumption of absence of arbitrage opportunities inherent in the 
expectations theory invariably assumes that the next best investment alternative is found 
in the same market for government securities and there are no other assets. That is, over 
the duration of the longer-term bills, the series of shorter-term bills represent the best 
alternative investment considering, among other things, the desired portfolio risk. In 
practical however, the investor has other alternatives carrying the same total risk or 
having the same effect on the investor's portfolio. Nelson (1972) points out the failure of 
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the theory to recognize this. He argues that there is a need to generalize the concept of 
risk to account for the relationship of returns from contracts in the bond market with 
those from nonbond assets in the participant's portfolio. Finally, recognizing that long-
term yield is influenced by other factors allow for the slope of the yield curve to also 
capture the impact of the demand and supply forces. 
Is the Tanzanian primary market for Treasury bills efficient? To a large extent the 
evidence provides an indication of the conformance of the Treasury bill market to the 
weak form conditions of market efficiency at least for the June 2000 to October 2002 
period. First, significant term premium are observed in all term structure equations for 
both WAY and LSPY. That is, in an efficient market, buyers of longer-term instruments 
will demand a premium if they know that they have to hold them until they mature. 
Second, the spread between the current long- and short-term yields has ability to predict 
future change in the short-term yields. Finally, the yields reflect inflation though not on 
one-on-one basis. In general, assuming that the low volatility displayed in the more 
recent yields and inflation rates continue, the conclusion is that the market efficiency is 
improving with time. 
4.7 Implications on the Cost of Government Borrowing 
The objective of auctioning government securities is twofold in nature. First the 
government wants to ensure that the instruments offered for sale are sold and the intended 
amount is raised. Second it wants to minimize the interest it pays on the debt it raises. 
With the debt being sold using an auction system, minimizing the cost of debt also means 
maximizing revenues raised for a given face value. In this part the study looks at the 
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implications on the cost of government borrowing in two parts - first by analyzing the 
yields from the current auction system and second by looking at the appropriateness of 
the auction system. 
Having a yield curve that has a slope lower than hypothesized might imply existence 
of systematic arbitrage opportunities. Treasury bills buyers are better off by buying long-
term bills and holding them to maturity rather that buying and rolling over short-term 
bills. However, these opportunities are mitigated by risk considerations and the presence 
of other assets. To the issuer, that is the government, the position is reversed and, 
assuming no monetary policy considerations or transaction costs, it pays to issue shorter-
term bills and refinance them at maturity. To understand the extent to which the data 
support this view, the yields on 364-day bills are compared with the annualized 
compounded average yields for 91- and 182-day bills. ln this comparison, only the WAY 
is used since the discriminatory pricing system used makes WAY the average cost of 
borrowing to the government. The annualized WAY for the shorter maturing bills are 
restated to periodic yields over the respective maturity and then compounded over the life 
of the longer maturing bills. For this purpose, the formula ((l+WA1ioo *~
6
/%-1)*100, 
where D is the maturity in days, is used. Thus, the periodic ( un-annualized) WAY for 91-
and 182-day bills are compounded quarterly and semi-annually respectively. 
Table 4.10 shows that over the June 1998 through October 2002 period the average 
WAY on a 364-days bill exceeded that of compounded WAY on 91- and 182-daybills by 
0.99 and 1.8 percentage points respectively. Even for the more recent data, over a one-
year period, the yield on a 364-days bill exceeds that of compounded WAY on 91-day 
bills by 1.5 percentage points. This also means that, for a given face value of Treasury 
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bills, issuing four consecutive 91-day bills results into interest cost that is about 25 
percent lower than issuing one 364-day bill. Overall, the results in table 4.10 suggest that 
the government might be able to reduce its interest cost on Treasury bill by issuing short-
term bills. In relation to the term structure results this also implies that the further the 
coefficient of the term structure is below the hypothesized value, the more the savings in 
interest costs. 
In the absence of secondary market, switching from long to short-term bills has 
negligible implications on the overall aggregate money supply as long as the central bank 
is credible in its commitment to refinance at maturity. On the other hand one has to 
consider the implications the change might have on the yield structure, the risk of debt 
management and issuing costs. First, if the government issues more of the shorter 
maturing bills the yield structure is likely to be altered with shorter-term yields increasing 
and longer term yields decreasing. This reduces the excess yield and with it the benefits 
of issuing shorter term bills. Second, issuing short-term bills is likely to increase the risk 
of government debt management particularly when short-term yields are highly volatile. 
By issuing short-term bills and refinancing them at maturity the government is exposing 
itself to the risk that it may have to refinance them with bills of a higher yield. Based on 
the data the risk element may not be a serious problem. It was noted earlier that the yields 
show a general declining trend (Figure Al.1 appendix 1) and the recent data show that 
the yields are low and less volatile. This, though does not having a yield that is stable, 
reduces the risk of refinancing short-term bills at a yield that is significantly higher. 
Finally, with low refinancing risk, the key issue is whether the mix of shorter- and 
longer-term bills issued achieves an optimum excess yield considering that issuing a 
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series of short-term bills instead of one long-term bill increases the issuing costs. This is 
an issue that the government may wish to examine further. 
As noted earlier the BOT uses a multiple-price, sealed-bid auction system with all bids 
being competitive and awards being based on individual bids. On its face this system may 
seem to maximize revenues and minimize the cost of debt as bidders pay their respective 
prices. However, this is only true if all successful bids represent bidders' true valuation of 
the securities. A number of studies have shown that bidders' behavior, particularly the one 
that affects the relation between the values of the bids and the true valuation, is greatly 
influenced by the price used to award the item(s) being auctioned (Chari and Webber, 1992; 
Nautz and Wolfstetter, 1997; Laffont, 1997). Though sealed-bid, discriminatory price 
auctioning system tends to encourage bidders to shed prices, such practice carries the risk 
that a bidder may not be awarded securities. This has some further effects. First, there is an 
incentive for bidders to acquire more information on how other bidders are going to bid. 
Sometimes this information may have no value to the society (Chari and Webber, 1992) 
especially when the issuer has some mechanisms - that are unknown to bidders - to reduce 
the effects of bid shading. Second, it may encourage bidders to submit multiple bids and in 
effect open the auction to manipulation. 
Bid shading is not prevalent in a uniform price auction system since most bidders are 
likely to pay a price that is different from - and in this situation lower than - the one in their 
bids. As a result bids under this system are closer to the bidders' true valuation and higher 
than those in the pay-your-price system. The findings that the uniform price system tend to 
results into more revenues - hence lower cost - to the issuer (Friedman, 1956; Milgrom and 
Webber, 1982; Ausubel and Crampton, 1998 and others) not only support that the system 
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leads to higher bids but also suggests that the lowest price that clears the securities being 
auctioned is higher that the weighted average price in the pay-your price system. The fact 
that the price a bidder pays does not depend on that bidder's bid is probably the reason why 
uniform price achieves better distribution of auction awards than the discriminatory 
system ( Pulizzi and Nicholson, 1998; Haller and Lengwiler, 1998; and Heller and 
Lengwiler, 1998). The literature and observations, therefore, suggest that the auction 
system can be improved and the cost of government borrowing lowered by switching to 
uniform price auction system. 
Two further factors are likely to be contributing to the weakness in the current auction 
system in Tanzania - the fact that noncompetitive bids are not allowed and the absence of 
secondary market. Noncompetitive bids allow bidders to submit bids, usually in limited 
amounts and subject to low ceilings (Chari and Webber, 1992), without specifying a price. 
Bidders in this category are awarded securities using the weighted average price from 
competitive bids. Noncompetitive bids are likely to reduce price shading as they reduce the 
amount available for competitive bidding. The presence of a secondary market can serve as 
a correction factor to ensure that bidders do not bid a price that is too much is for the sake of 
ensuring that they are awarded securities. In this situation bidders' paying a price that is too 
much will find it difficult to sell the securities in the secondary market. As a result even 
conservative bidders will be encouraged to ensure that their bids reflect not only what they 
are willing to pay but also the conditions in the secondary market. 
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Table 4.10: Annualized compounded average WAY and excess yields 
Sample Period 98.6-02.10 98.6 -00.5 00.6-02.10 
364-days 9.68 13.98 6.07 
182-days" 8.69 12.92 5.21 
91- days" 7.87 11.93 4.55 
Excess yieldb 0.99 1.06 0.86 
Excess yieldc 0.82 0.99 0.66 
Excess yieldd 1.81 2.05 1.52 
"The periodic (un-annualized) WAY for 91- and 182-day bills are compounded quarterly and semi-
annually respectively 
b Difference benveen average WAY on a 3 64-days and average compounded WAY on a 182-day bill 
' Difference benveen average compounded WAY on a 182-days and average compounded WAY on a 
91-day bill 
ct Difference benveen average WAY on a 3 64-days and average compounded WAY on a 91-day bill 
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CHAPTERS 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Summary 
This study examines the pricing process of treasury bills in Tanzania and how it is 
related to the term structure of interest rates and the notion of market efficiency. It uses 
the biased expectations theory of the term structure of interest rates and the theory of 
market efficiency to derive a representation of the behavior of the yields to maturity 
obtained from Treasury bill auctions. The understanding of market efficiency and 
investors' rationality is also enhanced by an examination of how Treasury bill yields are 
influenced by inflation expectations. The study covers the period from June 1998 through 
October 2002 and uses the annualized yields to maturity for three maturities - 91-days, 
182-days and 364-days - obtained from weekly Treasury bill auctions and the annualized 
three- and six-months inflation rates. The sample period is split into two part and both the 
weighted average yields (WAY) as well as the yields to maturity obtained by the lowest 
successful price (LSPY) are used. The relationships among the yields and between the 
yields and inflation rates are examined using equations based on the biased expectations 
theory of the term structure of interest rates as well as the Fisher hypothesis. 
The data were analyzed using SAS statistics software. The residuals from most of the 
initial estimates were found to be autocorrelated and heteroscedastic. Adjustment to these 
problems was based on the assumption of an exponential generalized autoregressive 
conditional heteroscedasticity (EGARCH) model that combines a/h order autoregressive 
error model with the GARCH(p,q) variance. The order of autocorrelation was determined 
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by using BACKS TEP option in the SAS code while the GARCH specification was 
restricted to GAR CH ( 1, 1) or lower. 
When the entire sample is used, mixed results are produced for the equations testing 
the biased expectations theory as well as those for the relationship between the yields and 
inflation rates. However when the data are split, a clearer picture emerges. For the June 
1998 through May 2000 period the yields do not show the presence of a significant term 
premium for any of the term structure equations, irrespective of the type of yields used. 
The term premium is also absent for the June 2000 through October 2002 period when 
three - and six-month yields are used as short- and long-term yields respectively. When 
12-month yields are used as long-term yields both WAY and LSPY have term premia 
that are significant with LSPY faring better than WAY. The presence of a significant 
term premium also mean the hypothesis that longer maturing bills are riskier cannot be 
rejected. In all equations, the coefficients are positive and significantly different from 
zero. The coefficients are, however, below their theoretically hypothesized values. The 
significance of the coefficients implies that the current spread between long- and short-
term yields contains information that is useful in the prediction of future short-term 
yields. 
The results for the relationship between the yields and inflation rates show the 
presence of a real yield that is significant and that inflation is used in determining the 
yields. The Fisher effect holds, though not on one-to-one basis. Overall, LSPY provides 
more satisfactory results than WAY supporting the notion that bidders quoting the 
minimum successful price are more informed. LSPY's term premiums are significant at 
higher levels of confidence, the yield curves have larger coefficients and the equations 
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have higher R2s. The better results for the tests in the split data are attributable to the low 
level and variability of the yields and inflation rates in the June 2000 through October 
2002 period, that make both the yields and inflation rates easier to predict and hence 
more useful in forecasting nominal yields and future short-term yields. In general, the 
market seems to be efficient and, assuming the low volatility displayed in the more recent 
yields and inflation rates continues, this efficiency is improving with time. On the other 
hand the efficiency could be improved and the cost of government borrowing lowered by 
switching from discriminatory pricing of awarded securities to uniform pricing system. 
5.2 Implications, Limitations and Future Research 
The findings in the study have a number of implications, two of which were raised in 
the previous chapter. First, is on the cost of government borrowing and second is the 
superiority of the result from LSPY over those from WAY has implications on the 
auction system. In the absence of debt instruments issued by the private sector, the 
findings in this study are not sufficient to assess the implication of the term structure on 
monetary policy transmission. That is, whether the yields' effects transfer to the other 
interest rates particularly the yields on long-term lending instruments issued by private 
entities. On the other hand a cursory look at the short-term rates by commercial banks 
(BOT Monthly Economic Review March 2003) shows a narrowing spread between 
lending and deposit rates in the June 2000 through October 2002 period. Deposit rates are 
almost flat but lending rates are falling. However, the spread is still high at more that 10 
percentage points and the lending rates seem to be declining slower than the Treasury bill 
yields. 
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It is a common knowledge that specification of a hypothesis and its underlying 
assumptions are critical in the interpretation ofresults from empirical tests on the 
hypothesis. The specifications and assumptions in this study dictated and in effect limited 
the extent to which tests were conducted on the data to understand the relationships 
among the yields and those between the yields and inflation. Thus the empirical results 
on the biased expectations hypothesis and the Fisher effect models in this study can only 
be accepted or rejected based on their specifications and assumptions. Changing the 
specifications and the assumptions can greatly enhance the understanding of the issues 
examined in this study. Froot (1989), for instance, found that the expectations hypothesis 
fits the data better if expectations are taken from survey rather than when they are based 
on rational expectations assumption. Again here it may be assumed that revealing 
expectations does not affect buyers' and sellers' behavior. 
Being a pioneering study in this area in Tanzania, the study adopted a narrow focus 
but it offers a basis on which a wide range of research can be based on. First is the use of 
general equilibrium approaches that recognize the presence of other assets and 
incorporate them in modeling the term structure. In Tanzania, such assets include foreign 
currencies. It was noted earlier that banks are the major players in both the Treasury bill 
market and the foreign currency market. Banks use the latter market to hedge against 
currency depreciation as well as to store liquidity. If, for example, the Tanzanian shilling 
is expected to depreciate banks may hedge by buying foreign currency rather than 
treasury bills with the possible result being higher yields in the Treasury bill market. 
Indeed, the risk of change in the value of the local currency may be as equally important 
as the default risk in the choice of investments. Considering the foreign currency market 
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is also critical especially since the data shows that the yields do not adequately reflect 
inflation. In addition to including foreign currency in a generalized term structure model, 
one may be interested to test the relation between the change in the value of the currency 
and the yields in the Treasury bill market. 
The alternative approach is to derive a model for the expected demand given the 
amount offered. This is of particular importance in the pay-your-bid system. 
Theoretically a bidder sets the bid price on assumption that it is the market-clearing price. 
Given a demand model, it is possible for bidders to bring their bids closer to the expected 
market-clearing price with an improved level of accuracy. The model may need to take 
into account factors such as seasonal patterns, the liquidity position of market participants 
- specifically banks - and the conditions that may make the issuer sell bills of amount 
different from the offered amount. The latter may include the perceived urgency for the 
government to secure fund to, say, retire maturing debt or meet a budget shortfall while 
banks' liquidity position is affected by factors such as aggregate deposits and the central 
bank's examination cycle. It is important to note that the bid pattern revealed by the data 
in the current discriminatory pricing system, particularly the unsuccessful bids, might not 
be a true indicator of the demand pattern due to possibility of bid shading. 
A number of interesting observations that are not directly related to the issues 
examined in this study were made during the data collection process. First, the dispersion 
in the yields for successful bids is sometimes very high. In the sample period some 
dispersions were more than 5 percentage points while most were above one percentage 
point. This implies that for a given auction and maturity, it is not uncommon to find a 
highest accepted yield that is 20 percent above the lowest yield. This is much higher than 
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the maximum of 6 percent observed by Godbout et al. (2002) in Canada. Since the 
dispersion is associated with abnormal conditions in the market and has been found to 
affect the performance of the term structure model (Godbout et al., 2002) a look at the 
explanation for the high dispersion observed and its possible effects on the integrity of 
the auctioning system is a worthwhile research issue. 
The information released after each auction also reveals that the BOT, on behalf of 
the treasury, does sell bills of amounts different from the one stated in pre-auction 
announcements. It is understandable that bills of amount less than that offered can be sold 
if not enough bids are received or if the seller has target minimum price (as is likely to be 
the case though such price is not revealed) and the received bids that are above this price 
fall short of the offered amount. The motives for selling above the offered amount are, 
however, not so clear and at best they are subject to speculation. 
Now that government securities are scheduled for trading in the secondary market, it 
will be interesting to compare the performance of term structure models results based on 
the yields from the primary market for the period without secondary market and for the 
period when the treasury bills are traded in the secondary market once sufficient 
observations become available. In general answers to some interesting research issues 
require a comprehensive evaluation of the auction system. 
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Appendix 1: 1993-2002 Weighted Average Yields and Inflation Rates: Graphs and 
Summary statistics 
Figure Al .1: Weighted Average Yields obtained from Treasury bill auctions 
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Table A 1.1: 91-days Treasury bill yields (percent) 
Year 1993/4 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Low 21.30 25.59 7.32 5.01 7.84 5.45 4.40 2.62 2.02 
High 71.63 71.83 28.08 15.91 15.56 16.52 15.36 6.38 5.30 
Average 36.44 40.43 15.30 9.59 12.06 10.09 9.29 4.22 3.62 
Standard 
Deviation 9.94 10.31 5.66 2.92 1.79 3.48 4.02 0.87 0.72 
Coefficient 
of Variation 0.27 0.26 0.37 0.30 0.15 0.34 0.43 0.21 0.20 
Source: Bank of Tanzania and own computations 
Table A 1.2: 182-days Treasury bill yields (percent) 
Year 1993/4 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Low 22.14 29.87 8.98 4.20 9.22 6.32 5.99 3.07 2.54 
High 65.00 71.45 37.25 15.47 16.57 16.96 16.84 6.07 4.90 
Average 42.33 46.31 18.15 10.06 13.44 10.90 10.53 4.81 3.94 
Standard 
Deviation 11.31 10.12 6.45 2.87 2.04 3.55 3.93 0.89 0.52 
Coefficient 
of Variation 0.27 0.22 0.36 0.29 0.15 0.33 0.37 0.19 0.13 
Source: Bank of Tanzania and own computations 
Table Al.3: 364-days Treasury bill yields (percent) 
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Low 31.67 11.46 7.98 12.03 8.96 6.14 4.54 3.00 
High 71.01 40.37 17.31 17.85 17.24 17.07 7.47 5.59 
Average 49.16 21.78 12.16 15.26 12.77 11.82 5.78 4.48 
Standard Deviation 10.19 6.59 2.54 1.41 2.73 3.77 0.86 0.58 
Coefficient of 
Variation 0.21 0.30 0.21 0.09 0.21 0.32 0.15 0.13 
Source: Bank of Tanzania and own computations 
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